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Is cooperation intuitive or deliberative? From an early notion of cooperation as a deliberate 
suppression of innate selfish preferences, a growing body of literature has turned the general 
perception towards prosocial behaviour as something intuitive, sometimes actively oppressed 
for the sake of selfish needs and wishes. If the dual-process framework from psychology gives 
a better description of decision making than do the classical economic models, this will have 
important implications for many economic models. Testing the social heuristics hypothesis 
through a sequential prisoner’s dilemma conducted both in the lab and by an online survey, I 
find no conclusive evidence that increased deliberation systematically changes willingness to 
cooperate with strangers. This is the first study (to my knowledge) to isolate the effect of a 
manipulation through preferences. The results hold for both a general regression of cooperation 
on the deliberation treatment, and for the main analysis, with separate effects through 
preferences and beliefs.  
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1 Introduction and literature 
The present thesis experimentally investigates the stability of preferences; specifically, 
preferences that determine our willingness to cooperate with strangers in social dilemmas. The 
thesis adds to the literature by investigating the assumed conflict between intuitive and 
reflective thinking in new datasets from both a lab experiment and from the Norwegian Citizen 
Panel (NCP). I test the predictions of the social heuristics hypothesis (SHH); that increased 
deliberation will reduce cooperation (Rand et al., 2012, Rand et al., 2014, Bear and Rand, 
2016).1 What makes the present research novel, is the attempt to try and assess whether such 
effects of cognitive processes, if present, work through preferences or beliefs. Evidence from a 
study on framing in social dilemmas indicate that social framing effects work through beliefs 
rather than preferences (Ellingsen et al., 2012).  
In a one-shot, sequential prisoner’s dilemma, I test whether increased deliberation changes the 
willingness to cooperate with strangers. Deliberation is promoted by asking half of the subjects 
to give a written justification prior to making the decision to either cooperate or defect. Holding 
beliefs constant for the group of second movers, the effect through preferences is isolated. If 
the observed level of cooperation changes due to increased reflection, this could indicate that 
preferences are not stable.  
In microeconomic theory, we assume that agents behave rationally and that their tastes are 
complete and transitive. These are axiomatic assumptions, critical to the logical completeness 
of microeconomic theory and the models therein. Moreover, it is common to assume that agents 
have a single set of preferences that are stable with respect to time and situation (Stigler and 
Becker, 1977, Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Chapter 1). The stability of preferences is not a logical 
necessity, but critical to the predictive power of models attempting to explain social preferences 
and behaviour, e.g. Rabin (1993) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999).  
In a sequential game, beliefs are held constant for the second mover, allowing the separation of 
the two possible channels responsible for a treatment effect. This is done both in the lab 
experiment and in the NCP survey. The lab experiment serves as a pilot for the larger NCP 
dataset, but also adds valuable observation data to the pooled dataset analysed in section 3.3. 
The NCP is an online survey and experiment tool similar to Amazon Mechanical Turk, but with 
                                                 
1 The theory, and its predictions, will be discussed further in section 1.2. 
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an attempted representative selection of the Norwegian population. Participants in the NCP 
have been chosen at random from the National registry to receive an invite.  
In a social dilemma, here understood as a non-zero-sum game, players may pay a personal cost 
to cooperate to benefit the common good. The collectively rational decision, giving the highest 
total payoff, is for everyone to cooperate. The personally payoff-maximizing decision, in terms 
of money, is to defect and hope that everyone else contributes (Dawes, 1980).2 A much used 
social dilemma is a public good game (PGG) in which each player’s contribution is doubled 
and then divided between four players (see e.g. Ledyard (1995) and Cone and Rand (2014)). 
Since each contribution is doubled, contributing is clearly socially optimal. Yet, the personal 
marginal benefit of a player’s contribution is less than the personal marginal cost, so the rational 
decision for a selfish individual is not to contribute. Thus, the unique Nash-equilibrium is that 
nobody cooperates.  
It is a well-known fact that levels of cooperation in social dilemma games tend to well exceed 
the levels predicted by economic theory for a selfish agent; the homo economicus. Typically, 
the observed levels of cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games are in the range of 40-60%  
(Ledyard, 1995, Sally, 1995, Chaudhuri, 2011). Similar results are also found for one-shot 
PGGs (Dawes and Thaler, 1988). Economists have long struggled to properly explain these 
high numbers, and to come up with models that accurately predict this sort of behaviour (see 
e.g. Becker (1976)).  
One experimentally motivated explanation for seemingly altruistic behaviour, is that people are 
concerned not only with their own payoff, but also with the fairness of the outcome. Rabin 
(1993) models this in a framework of reciprocity, introducing three stylized facts: (i) People are 
willing to sacrifice some material payoff to be nice to those who are nice to them. (ii) People 
are willing to sacrifice some material payoff to hurt those who hurt them. (iii) Stylized facts (i) 
and (ii) have greater impact as material payoff gets smaller. If preferences and/or beliefs are not 
stable, this poses problems for Rabin’s model when used to predict behaviour.   
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose a different explanation for cooperation in social dilemmas. 
They show that, if some agents care about equality, equilibria may occur where it is rational to 
cooperate even for selfish individuals. A weakness with this model, as pointed out by Binmore 
and Shaked (2010), is that the number of free parameters makes it flexible to the point where it 
                                                 
2 Such social dilemmas include varieties of public goods games (PGG), the trust game and prisoner’s dilemma. 
The dictator game has some similar attributes, but is conventionally a zero-sum game. 
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becomes tautological. Thus, the model may well explain behaviour, but is less suited to make 
out-of-sample predictions about behaviour if preferences are not stable.  
How do we model and predict behaviour if preferences are unstable? The notion of dual-process 
thinking has been popular in the academic literature of psychology and economics for some 
decades (see e.g. Kahneman et al. (1973), Evans et al. (1983), Chaiken and Trope (1999), Evans 
(2003), Kahneman (2003)). In recent years, many studies have indicated that there is indeed a 
difference between intuitive and deliberative decision making, and that cooperation seems to 
be the intuitive response in a social dilemma, whereas reflective decision making is more selfish 
(Rand et al., 2012, Zaki and Mitchell, 2013, Rand et al., 2014, Bear and Rand, 2016, Cappelen 
et al., 2016, Rand, 2016, Strømland et al., 2016). Other studies find no evidence suggesting that 
intuition is more cooperative than deliberation (Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester, 2014, Hauge et 
al., 2016, Bouwmeester et al., 2017). 
The overall explanation for cooperation in social dilemmas is beyond the scope of the present 
text. Instead, it considers the role of cognitive modes and processes in forming preferences and 
beliefs. If beliefs and preferences are sensitive to cognitive processes or changes in cognitive 
mode, then behavioural models, like the ones presented by Rabin (1993) and Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999), will give inconsistent predictions. As will the standard rational agent-model. Indeed, all 
behavioural models that hinge on the assumption that preferences are stable, will give 
inconsistent predictions.3 Within a dual-process framework, the present thesis investigates the 
stability of preferences and the possible conflict between intuitive and deliberative decision 
making, and its implications for behavioural models. 
1.1 Dual-process theory 
Dual-process theory is an umbrella term for a set of theories stating that the human mind 
consists of two distinct cognitive subsystems. For reference, I use the framework presented by 
psychologist and Nobel prize laureate in Economics, Daniel Kahneman. He describes the dual-
process thinking as two opposing systems of our cognition, simply called system one and 
system two (Kahneman et al., 1973, Kahneman, 2003, Kahneman, 2011). These are competing 
systems, both with their unique strengths and weaknesses.  
In short, system one is the intuitive system; quickly making decisions based on heuristics and 
simplifications (Kahneman et al., 1973, Evans et al., 1983, Evans, 2003, Kahneman, 2011). It 
                                                 
3 To my knowledge, all behavioural models within economics hinge on the assumption that preferences are stable.  
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works fast, and (almost) effortlessly comes up with answers. When faced with a difficult 
question or problem, system one might come up with an answer to an entirely different question, 
but an answer nonetheless (Kahneman, 2011).  
System two is slow and demands more effort than system one. But it is also much better at 
evaluating all available information, and importantly, separating important information from 
the trivial (Evans, 2003). Being costly to use, system two is lazy, and gladly lets system one do 
all the work, unless specifically commanded to take control (Kahneman, 2011, p. 35). This calls 
for deliberate reflection, which is the core of the present thesis.  
Dual-process theory is different from standard microeconomic theory in some important 
respects. Notably, in neoclassical microeconomics, few assumptions are made about the actual 
processes and tastes involved in individual decision making. Instead, it is assumed that people 
behave as if they maximize some underlying objective function. The inputs of such functions 
are taken as given and are usually not delved any further into (Stigler and Becker, 1977).  
However, to many economic models (e.g. Rabin (1993) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999)) the 
stability of preferences and beliefs is important. Formally, most (if not all) behavioural models 
assume that tastes are not only complete and transitive, but also stable; invariant with regard to 
time and place.  
In the present thesis, I investigate whether preferences are invariant with respect to cognitive 
mode. Is there, as Kahneman and many with him suggest (Rand et al., 2012, Zaki and Mitchell, 
2013, Cone and Rand, 2014, Evans et al., 2015, Bear and Rand, 2016), an internal conflict 
between intuitive and deliberative thinking (system one and system two)? And if so, through 
what mechanisms does such a conflict materialize in a social dilemma?  
A growing body of literature suggests there is indeed an internal conflict between intuitive and 
reflective thinking. Many studies find that, in social dilemmas, intuition favours cooperation 
rather than defection (Rand et al., 2012, Zaki and Mitchell, 2013, Cone and Rand, 2014, Rand 
et al., 2014, Bear and Rand, 2016, Cappelen et al., 2016, Rand, 2016, Strømland et al., 2016). 
This conclusion has been challenged both on technical grounds (Tinghög et al., 2013, Myrseth 
and Wollbrant, 2015, Myrseth and Wollbrant, 2016), and by similar studies finding no effects, 
or inconclusive evidence (Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester, 2014, Hauge et al., 2016, 
Bouwmeester et al., 2017). Nevertheless, considering the amount of evidence suggesting 
prosocial behaviour is intuitive, this serves as my working hypothesis. Specifically, I base the 
analysis primarily on the social heuristics hypothesis. 
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1.2 The social heuristics hypothesis 
A theory which has gained much ground lately, is the social heuristics hypothesis (SHH), 
presented by Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012), and refined by Rand et al. (2014) and Bear and 
Rand (2016). The general idea is that people learn, through socialization and everyday 
activities, that cooperation with others tends to be beneficial; even to the extent that it will often 
be worth paying a personal cost to promote the common good. Internalizing the idea that 
cooperation is beneficial, prosocial behaviour develops as the intuitive, default choice in a 
social dilemma (Capraro et al., 2014, Rand et al., 2014, Bear and Rand, 2016). When faced with 
new and unknown surroundings and situations, such as a lab experiment, those who have 
internalized the idea that cooperation is beneficial, tend to use this as a heuristic for making 
decisions.  
If a share of the population have these social heuristics, one would expect a treatment promoting 
intuition to increase cooperation (Rand et al., 2014). Conversely, increased deliberation and 
reflection should decrease cooperation. A one-shot economic game will seem unnatural to most, 
as most people rarely encounter real one-shot situations in everyday life. The SHH predicts that 
individuals will draw on former experience and norms, and extrapolate these to the unfamiliar 
situations of a lab environment or a one-shot game.  
This out-of-context use of social heuristics, is predicted only for individuals who are used to an 
environment where prosocial behaviour has shown to be beneficial, and who are unfamiliar 
with the lab environment. For individuals who have experience from the lab setting or one-shot 
games, or are in other ways used to being rewarded for anti-social behaviour, the SHH predicts 
no effect of manipulating cognitive mode. Importantly, according to the SHH, intuition should 
never lower cooperation (Rand et al., 2014). The SHH claims that intuition promotes 
cooperation though preferences (Rand et al., 2012). There are, however, also theories 
emphasizing other mechanisms than social heuristics. Some of these mechanisms might explain 
how increased deliberation could also give more cooperation in social dilemmas.  
1.3 Reactive egoism and moral deliberation 
In the present study, we use a treatment to promote deliberation, rather than intuition. One 
possible side effect of increased deliberation is perspective taking. When taking the time to 
deliberate a decision, many subjects will presumably think further ahead, and form empirical 
expectations. In a game including other players, deliberation could make subjects form a clearer 
idea of what they expect the others to do. Torsvik et al. (2011) find that announced post-play 
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face-to-face discussion decreases contributions to a common good. These results are interpreted 
as an effect of perspective taking and empirical expectations. This closely relates to the present 
study, where subjects are given a deliberation treatment.  
There is a large body of literature advocating the positive effects of perspective taking in social 
interactions and bargaining, e.g. Neale & Bazerman (1983), Batson (1995), Galinsky & 
Moskowitz (2000) and Savitsky et al. (2005). The general idea is that taking the perspective of 
others help diminish egocentric biases in judgement (Epley et al., 2006). A common problem 
in social interactions and bargaining, is that people are egocentrically biased in their assessment 
of fairness, and feel they deserve more than their fair share of resources (Babcock and 
Loewenstein, 1997, Paese and Yonker, 2001). Therefore, it has long been a commonly held 
belief that perspective taking is beneficial in bargaining situations through helping promote 
prosocial behaviour and reducing egocentric bias (Epley et al., 2006).  
In a study of several social interactions, Epley et al. (2006) find evidence suggesting that taking 
the perspective of the other players, might actually increase taking in a take some-game.4 
Similar results are found in the other games as well, bringing about a theory of reactive egoism 
(Epley et al., 2006). The hypothesis is that agents in a social dilemma will often, when uncertain 
about the choices of others, think badly of them, and react on this assumed selfishness with 
selfish behaviour. In other words: when taking another’s perspective, people tend to fear that 
the other will behave selfishly, and counter this assumed selfishness by behaving more selfishly 
themselves.  
Reactive egoism closely relates to the results found by Torsvik et al. (2011): In addition to the 
prospect of having to defend their (lack of) contribution, the participants might have also 
considered what the others would have done. The authors interpret the decrease in cooperation 
as a response to the empirical expectations imposed by the announcement of post-play face-to-
face discussion. 
Subjects in the present study are not specifically asked to take the perspective of the other 
player, as is the treatment in the study by Epley et al. (2006). Still, it is plausible that the 
deliberation treatment could induce some perspective taking.5 Consider a sequential prisoner’s 
                                                 
4 One of the scenarios studied was a classic tragedy of the commons, where perspective taking led the subjects to 
take even more of the common resource for themselves, even though the share they deemed was fair for them to 
take decreased with the perspective taking. 
5 Text data from the NCP responses, although not paired with subject IDs, suggests this applies at least for some 
of the subjects. 
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dilemma; the game in question in the present thesis. For player 1 (i.e. the first mover), the action 
of player 2 (i.e. the second mover) is unknown, and of paramount importance to his own 
monetary payoff. This is obviously something to reflect upon. For player 2, there is little, if any, 
room for reflection concerning player 1’s choice, since player 2 has full knowledge about this 
when making her decision.  
How will the deliberation treatment affect player 2? Because player 2 knows what player 1 has 
chosen, the treatment can only work through player 2’s preferences. It is possible that increased 
deliberation will strengthen moral sentiments, and thus enforce norm compliance such as 
reciprocity (Rabin, 1993, Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), despite reduced personal payoff in terms 
of money. Through such mechanisms, a deliberation treatment might increase cooperation in 
the second stage of a sequential prisoner’s dilemma, contrary to the prediction of the SHH. An 
overwhelming share of the subjects in the treatment groups in NCP mention either “fairness” 
or “equality” in their written response.6  
If we believe that the human mind works in the manner proposed by dual-process theory, with 
two distinct sets of preferences, then we need to specifically model the choice of preference set 
in any given decision-making situation. Otherwise, we will be unable to make predictions about 








                                                 
6 Although we cannot pair the written justifications with the actual choices made. 
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2 Experimental design 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
Consider an individual with two distinct sets of preferences; one intuitive, and the other 
deliberative. Let the two sets be represented by the utility functions U𝑖  =  U𝑖(𝐗) and U𝑑  =
 U𝑑(𝐗) respectively, where 𝐗 is a commodity vector. Except for the conventional assumptions 
of completeness, transitivity and continuity, no additional assumptions about the functions are 
needed. As is custom in microeconomic theory, we assume that the agent attempts to maximize 
the value of her chosen utility function, or at least acts as if she does. Within the framework 
proposed by the SHH, the deliberative preferences, represented by utility function U𝑑, is 
assumed to be more selfish than the intuitive preferences (i.e. U𝑖).  
For any given situation, assume that agent 𝑗 maximizes either utility U𝑖𝑗 or U𝑑𝑗 with 
probabilities 𝛾𝑗 and (1 −  𝛾𝑗) respectively. 𝛾𝑗 is the individual specific probability of making 
an intuitive decision, while (1 −  𝛾𝑗) is the probability of deliberating. A high 𝛾𝑗 means that 
agent 𝑗 has a high probability of making an intuitive decision, when faced with a problem, 
whereas a low 𝛾𝑗 corresponds to a high probability of deliberation.  
Whether the same 𝛾𝑗 can be assumed to apply only in social dilemmas or more generally, is 
beyond the scope of this text.7 𝛾𝑗 is likely to be a function of time, place, the type of decision, 
and many other factors (Bear and Rand, 2016), which can be hard to control for. However, 
Rubinstein (2016) shows that there is a strong correlation between individual relative response 
times over a set of different economic games.8 Assuming relative response time is a valid proxy 
for relative deliberation, we can assign each agent as a type, corresponding to the probability 
that he will make an intuitive decision.  
The problem posed by the SHH is that experience with the lab environment is predicted to alter 
an individual’s intuitive preferences, rather than the probability of deliberating. The same goes 
for individuals who are familiar with an environment which promotes selfishness and 
competitiveness rather than cooperation. These individuals are predicted to be intuitively more 
prone to making selfish decisions; which is formally distinct from being more prone to 
deliberating as opposed to making intuitive decisions. SHH predicts that certain factors make 
                                                 
7 Although, for applied research, it is an important question. 
8 For a more thorough presentation of player typology, see Rubinstein (2016). 
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the intuitive preferences more similar to the deliberative preferences; that is 𝑈𝑖𝑗 → 𝑈𝑑𝑗  as 
experience increases (Rand et al., 2014, Bear and Rand, 2016).  
I propose a different theoretical mechanism, which is to let experimental experience work 
through the probability of deliberating. As an alternative interpretation of the SHH, imagine 
that experimental experience and socialization in competitive environments decrease 𝛾𝑗; the 
probability of making an intuitive decision rather than deliberating. As individuals get more 
accustomed to the competitive setting of the lab, 𝛾𝑗 tends towards 0, and the probability of 
deliberation towards 1. This alternative interpretation, with a typology of players where 𝛾𝑗 is 
the individual type, is valid if, and only if, 𝑈𝑑𝑗 is inherently more selfish than 𝑈𝑖𝑗 in a social 
dilemma. This is what the SHH assumes (Rand et al., 2014, Bear and Rand, 2016). If this is 
indeed the case, changes in intuitive preferences may well be treated as a change in the 
probability of deliberating. This approach is also more flexible and easier to apply. Although 
formally distinct, the two methods yield the same result.9 
Setting an agent’s type equal to the probability that the given agent will make an intuitive 
decision, we say that agent 𝑗 is of type 𝛾𝑗. With no information about the situation for the 
decision, the best prediction for agent 𝑗’𝑠 behaviour is the behaviour which maximizes the 
weighted sum  
γ𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑿𝑈𝑖(𝑿) + (1 − γ𝑗)𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑿𝑈𝑑(𝑿) 
Making specific predictions about individual choices would require knowing the specifics of 
the agent’s utility functions, as well as knowing the agent’s type, both of which are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. This presentation is meant merely as an illustration of how dual-process 
cognition would affect microeconomic models, and a simple example of what a remedy might 
look like.  
2.2 Game setup 
In this thesis, I use data from a sequential prisoner’s dilemma. The same game has been run 
both as a pencil-and-paper experiment in a physical lab with N=187 respondents, and in the 
Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP) with N=1173 respondents. The main objective of the 
experiment is to uncover how, if at all, cognitive modes and processes might affect preferences. 
                                                 
9 Varying only the probability of deliberating is arguably preferable to changing the utility functions. Keeping the 
utility functions flexible would give so many free parameters that the model would become tautological (Binmore 
& Shaked, 2010). 
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Specifically, we want to know whether cooperation with strangers in a prisoner’s dilemma is 
intuitive, deliberative or alternatively that there is no internal conflict when deciding on whether 
to cooperate or to defect.  
Research by Rand et al. (2012), Rand et al. (2014) and Rand (2016) suggest that cooperation 
might be the default choice, whereas defection requires active reflection. In the present thesis, 
I ask the following: If deliberation and intuition elicit different degrees of cooperation, through 
which processes does a deliberation treatment work? Is it by altering the players’ preferences, 
or by changing their beliefs? In addition to having a large dataset, it is this last question that 
makes this study novel.  
To determine whether intuition and cooperation give different degrees of cooperation, we 
needed a controlled experiment with a control group and a treatment group. In addition to 
providing valuable observations, the lab experiment served as a pilot for the NCP study. Having 
first run the game in the lab, we could better decide how many subjects were needed. The lab 
experiment was conducted in six sessions on the same day. To get well-balanced groups, we 
had within-session randomization with both control and treatment in each session.  
The following game tree illustrates the decisions included: 
 
Figure 2.1. Game tree. Numbers indicate which player makes the decision, and letters indicate 
cooperation or defection. 2Y is the player who is told that player 1 has chosen the yellow box 
(i.e. cooperated). 2B is the player who is told that player 1 has chosen the blue box (i.e. 
defected). 
To answer the question about what cognitive processes were involved, we ran a sequential 2 










The bullets represent a decision 
between defection and cooperation. 
The data from the NCP include all 
three decisions, while the lab 




subjects were first-movers; player 1, and the other half played second move; player 2. Within 
each of these groups, there was a control group and a treatment group. Each player chose 
between a yellow box and a blue box; the yellow box corresponding to cooperation and the blue 
box to defection. 
By playing a sequential game, it is possible to separate the effect through preferences from the 
effect through beliefs. Player 2 knows, when making her decision, whether player 1 has chosen 
to cooperate or not. It is then reasonable to assume that the only way a deliberation treatment 
might change her willingness to cooperate, is through a change in her preferences for 
cooperation. After all, she already has full knowledge about player 1’s decision.10 For player 1 
however, there is also the element of uncertainty. He does not know whether player 2 will 
choose to cooperate or not, but must make his own assessment of the probability that she will. 
Thus, the deliberation treatment might affect player 1’s beliefs about the game, specifically 
about player 2’s decision.  
To distinguish the preference effect from the beliefs effect, one simply subtracts the deliberation 
effect on cooperation for player 2 (i.e. the preference effect) from the effect for player 1 (the 
total effect).11 The identifying assumption then is that, in absence of the treatment, player 1 and 
2’s preferences are the same in expectation. This makes the randomization vitally important. 
In the lab experiment, only the black bullets in the game tree were played out. This was done 
mainly to get enough statistical power in at least one stage of the game, but also because this is 
considered the most relevant test of SHH. It was believed that for a player who had been told 
that the other player had defected (i.e. chosen the blue box), there would be too little cooperation 
to observe an effect in the lab study (Rabin, 1993, Falk and Fischbacher, 2006).  
The player who knows that player 1 has chosen the blue box (i.e. defected) is called player 2B. 
It seems likely that reciprocity is a strong social norm, and that few would choose to cooperate 
if they already knew their partner had defected (Rabin, 1993, Falk and Fischbacher, 2006, 
Gächter et al., 2010, Rand and Nowak, 2013). For this reason, in the lab pilot, all subjects 
playing second move were told that player 1 had decided to cooperate. In the rest of the text, 
player 2 who knows that player 1 has cooperated, is called player 2Y.  
                                                 
10 A different interpretation is that agents reveal their true preferences through deliberation. If the true preferences 
are systematically different from preferences “clouded” by intuition, which is what the present thesis tests, it is 
meaningful to speak of distinct sets of preferences.  
11 Assuming preferences are equally affected by the treatment for both players.  
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Based on results from earlier studies, we were confident that many in the player 1 group would 
cooperate (Ledyard, 1995, Chaudhuri, 2011). All those assigned as player 2 were matched with 
a cooperating player 1. Provided that at least one in the player 1 group cooperated, there is no 
deception, as player 2 was told that she had been matched with a player 1 who had chosen to 
cooperate. Exactly who this player 1 was, is not important, as long as he existed. Player 1 was 
matched with a random player 2, and rewarded according to the combination of their decisions 
according to the following payoff-matrix: 
Table 2.2.1 Payoff-matrix for the lab experiment. Payoff in NOK. 
         Player 2 
 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 210, 210 100, 300 
Defect 300, 100 120, 120 
 
Player 1 plays the game as if it were simultaneous. All players are rewarded in the exact way 
that they were told in the instructions, and their decisions matter to the other players, so there 
is no deception.12  
Game setup and instructions were almost identical in the lab pilot as in the NCP data.13 The 
main difference was the payoff-structure. In the NCP, only four out of the 1173 respondents 
were drawn to receive payment. The payoff-matrix was the following: 
Table 2.2.2 Payoff-matrix for the NCP. Payoff in NOK. 
         Player 2 
 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 1000, 1000 0, 1500 
Defect 1500, 0 500, 500 
 
The expected value of the highest paying selfish outcome is 5,1 NOK, which amounts to weaker 
incentives than in the lab. Regarding relative desirability of the outcomes, the lab study and the 
                                                 
12 One unfortunate aspect of this way of matching respondents, is that by telling all player 2s that they will be 
matched with someone who has chosen to cooperate, one risks getting an expensive level of cooperation from 
player 2. Then again, playing the entire game tree would require more respondents, so the chosen solution appears 
to be the most convenient for the purpose of testing the SHH. 





NCP study are quite similar, and the SHH makes no predictions about differences in treatment 
effects following differences in material payoff (Rand et al., 2014, Bear and Rand, 2016). The 
different payoffs might, however, explain a lower over-all cooperation in the lab than in the 
NCP, due to a higher expected material payoff (Rabin, 1993).14 Even if subjects use non-linear 
probability weighting (as suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979)), the difference in 
expected value is quite substantial.15  
2.3 Treatment design 
Roughly half of the subjects in the present research were asked to give a written justification 
for their decision before ticking off the yellow or blue box. This treatment is meant to force the 
subjects to deliberate their decision. In earlier literature, the treatments have largely been either 
time pressure (Rand et al., 2012, Cone and Rand, 2014), cognitive load (Hauge et al., 2016), 
ego-depletion (Achtziger et al., 2011), or induction (Liu and Hao, 2011), all meant to stimulate 
intuition (Rand, 2016). A few have also tried to stimulate deliberation through time delay; e.g. 
Rand et al. (2012). In the present research, we induced deliberation by asking the respondents 
to give a written justification of their decision before actually making the decision. This was 
done in the exact same way in both the lab experiment and the NCP survey.16 One important 
motivation for choosing this treatment, was to be able to induce deliberation while sustaining a 
relatively high level of compliance. 
Compliance is often a problem in studies with time pressure, where many of the subjects will 
fail to respond within the given time frame (Tinghög et al., 2013). Even with time delay, one 
will see subjects failing to comply with the time delay (e.g. Rand et al. (2012)). Still, compliance 
is generally much higher with time delay than with time pressure. In our lab experiment, we 
had full compliance to the treatment. This is not only good for the preservation of scarce 
observation data, but means we do not have to worry about heterogeneity in compliance. 
Heterogeneity could give a selection problem in the analysis, and is therefore important to rule 
out. 
To make sure the treatment gave a deliberation effect, and not just an effect on understanding 
through reading the instructions several times, the instruction sheets in the lab experiment were 
                                                 
14 This is stated as the third stylized fact in Rabin’s famous article. 
15 Prospect theory suggests that agents do not weight probabilities linearly, but put a different emphasis on loss 
and gain. In the present case, prospect theory predicts that subjects will place an overly large probability weight 
on the prospect of winning 1500 NOK (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
16 The exact text presented to the subjects are presented in the appendix. 
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recollected before proceeding to the treatment and decision making. In the NCP survey, subjects 
were not able to go back to the instructions after proceeding to the decision-making screen. 
Allowing the subjects to read the instructions several times might have given a better 
understanding of the payoff-structure, but could also harm the validity of the treatment. If the 
treatment gave the subjects a better understanding of the game, this could have had its own 
effects on the outcome. However, if a deliberation effect is conditional on understanding, as 
suggested by Strømland et al. (2016), the game must be understood by enough subjects.  
2.4 Procedure in the lab experiment 
The lab experiment was conducted by Sidra Choudhary, Alexander Daoud, Kjetil Madland and 
Amanda Reigstad as part of a course in experimental economics at the University of Bergen. 
This experiment also served as a pilot for the seventh round of the Norwegian citizen panel 
(NCP). I did a power-analysis from the lab data, to get an estimate of how many subjects would 
be needed in each branch of the game tree in NCP. The empirical results from the lab study, 
along with the power-analyses and results from NCP, are presented in section 3.  
Participants in the lab pilot were recruited from mail lists of all students who had taken part on 
seminars in the subject ex.phil. at the University of Bergen in 2013 and 2014. This would 
suggest that the sample is relatively representative for the student mass at UiB. The geography 
of the campus means we must expect fewer students from the faculty for medicine and 
odontology to have participated. The lab is located in proximity to all other faculties, meaning 
the selection of students was probably quite diverse. The subjects were invited to participate 
voluntarily, and informed that they would be paid at least 100 NOK and possibly more, 
depending on their choices. They were informed that there would be an economic experiment, 
but not the purpose of the experiment.  
The experiment was conducted in six sessions, all in one day, at the DIGSSCORE Citizen lab. 
At arrival, the subjects were assigned to seats by drawing a random number from a bowl. The 
seats determined which group the subjects would play, and who would get the treatment. 
Therefore, it was important to make sure seating was randomized.  
After a brief introduction, the subjects were presented with the instruction sheet, which they 
had three minutes to read through before the sheets were recollected. Then they immediately 
got their respective decision sheets, and another three minutes to make their decisions (and give 
a written argument for their decision if they were in the treatment group). All sheets were 
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handed out and collected in the exact same order in all sessions. This way, all subjects had the 
same amount of time in all stages of the experiment. 
Once the decision sheets had been collected, the participants had to wait for the payments to be 
arranged. All in all, the sessions lasted an average of 25 minutes. The average payment to 
subjects were 221 Norwegian kroner (NOK). This makes for an hourly wage of 530 NOK; 
about three times what a student will earn in an average part time job, so the experiment should 
be well enough incentivized. Since cooperation in this case is about a trade-off between one’s 
own payoff and the payoff of a stranger, the level of material payoff can be expected to be of 
some importance, if not for the effect size, then at least for the level of cooperation (Rabin, 
1993). To ensure subject anonymity, we used a double-blind procedure, so those who matched 
player 1 and 2 and arranged the payment, were never in the same room as the subjects.   
2.5 The Norwegian Citizen Panel 
The Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP) is an online survey panel consisting of around 5000 active 
individuals, invited and selected on the basis of a probability sample to get a representative 
selection of the Norwegian population over the age of 18 (DIGSSCORE, 2017).17 The first 
panel survey was conducted in November 2013. Each participant will answer a survey 
approximately twice a year.  
Representativeness makes the NCP preferable to Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), which is a 
digital on-demand work force. Here, anyone can sign up to complete human intelligence tasks, 
and the workers can choose which tasks they would like to complete. This potentially makes 
selection a problem.  
Overly experienced workers, is another potential issue with AMT, at least for studies like the 
present one. One often sees that a relatively small share of AMT workers are responsible for a 
large portion of responses, and that many of them have extensive experience with classic 
paradigms within social sciences (Paolacci and Chandler, 2014).  
In some situations, where understanding is important, AMT may well prove to be a better option 
than the NCP, because of the differences in experience. One could argue that AMT workers 
provide more realistic responses than people who only rarely participate in surveys. Occasional 
survey participants may perceive the survey as unfamiliar and unnatural, and thus may answer 
differently than they would have done in “natural” everyday situations. However, for testing 
                                                 
17 The probability of being selected is a function of geography, gender, age and education among other things. 
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the social heuristics hypothesis (SHH), AMT would prove futile, as the SHH predicts a 
deliberation effect only for inexperienced individuals (Rand et al., 2014, Bear and Rand, 2016). 
For this study, the NCP might therefore be the best format for data collection. 
Our experiment was included in a round of survey in the NCP in 2016, and had N=1173 
participants. These were participants with little or no experience from economic games, 
because, according to the SHH, there will be a negative deliberation effect on cooperation only 
for subjects with limited experience from economic games and other “artificial lab 
environments” (Rand et al., 2014). Considering recent research on cooperation, the SHH 
seemed as the best candidate for a theory for explaining cooperation in a dual process 
framework, so lab experience was a leading concern when designing the experiment.  
The present experiment being part of a survey round in the NCP, participants had answered 
some questions before completing this experiment. These questions were mainly about politics 
and the organization of society. Examples of questions were “In general, how pleased are you 
with the Norwegian government?” and “Do you think refugees should have the same rights to 
social benefits as Norwegian citizens?”. Participants were also presented with a set of articles 
and asked which ones they would choose to read if they had to read a given number of them. 
The most troubling section of questions were about voluntary work, which may have primed 
the subjects to cooperation. Although the chances of framing and priming effects can never be 
written off entirely, it seems reasonable to assume this is not a significant problem in this study 
since the treatment is randomized. This illustrates why having control and treatment groups is 
of paramount importance for acquiring robust results. This way, subjects are evenly distributed 
across conditions, so that important parameters are the same in expectation. 
The survey lasted about 20 minutes in total, with the studied game at the end of the survey. This 
means that the subjects may have been tired and less concentrated. Although tired and 
unfocused subjects can give more random replies, and thus give more noisy data, it can also 
make the subjects “lazier” and have them rely more on their intuition. This could actually be 
beneficial to our experiment, as a very focused, deliberating control group would make it hard 




3 Results and interpretation 
3.1 Lab experiment 
The lab experiment was conducted with 187 subjects, randomized into control and treatment 
groups as shown in table 3.1.1. 
Table 3.1.1 Number of respondents in the lab experiment, by groups. 
 Treatment Control Total 
Player 1 47 45 92 
Player 2Y 47 48 95 
Total 94 93 187 
 
By running a simple regression of cooperation on the treatment dummy, all available knowledge 
from the lab study is pooled into a single deliberation effect. This is a relevant test of the SHH 
because the SHH predicts that, at least for a subsample of individuals, deliberation will always 
favour defection (Rand et al., 2014, Bear and Rand, 2016). Hence, the SHH predicts that the 
deliberation treatment will have a negative overall effect on cooperation.  
The main regression is the one where the deliberation effect is analysed separately for player 1 
and player 2. Here, we are able to separate the deliberation effect through the subjects’ 
preferences from the effect through beliefs. We also control for comprehension of the payoff-
matrix and for experience from similar lab experiments. Controlling for all possible interactions 
gives no significant coefficients, and lacks a solid theoretical foundation.  
I use the linear probability model (LPM) estimated with OLS with robust standard errors. In a 
linear probability model with a binary dependent variable, the standard errors are 
heteroscedastic by construction (Verbeek, 2012, p. 207, Wooldridge, 2014, p. 205).18 For all 
the regressions in the present thesis, probit and logit regressions give equivalent results as those 
from the LPM. All tables in the main body of the thesis are reported using the LPM estimated 
with OLS.19 The same tables with probit and logit are presented in appendix A. The main reason 
for using OLS is that the assumptions are less restrictive than in the maximum likelihood-
                                                 
18 The only exception is if all the coefficients for the independent variables are zero (Wooldridge, 2014). 
19 Although my working hypothesis (i.e. the SHH) is that deliberation will reduce cooperation, only two-sided 
tests are conducted, because the evidence for the SHH is controversial, and some studies find opposing effects. 
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models, and are plausible with a randomized dataset (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 70-81, 
860-864, Angrist and Pischke, 2008, p. 147-148). 
Table 3.1.2 shows the effects of different binary variables on the likelihood that a given subject 
in the lab experiment will choose the yellow box, which indicates cooperation. Player 2Y is the 
baseline. Table 3.1.2. presents four different specifications, all estimated with OLS. 
Table 3.1.2 Treatment effects on cooperation in the lab pilot. Linear probability model 
 
 No controls Separate effects 






Deliberation 0.0603 0.1551 0.0865 0.2563* 
 (0.0706) (0.0989) (0.2249) (0.1464) 
     
Player 1  0.0861 0.0795 0.2826** 
  (0.0987) (0.2327) (0.1364) 
     
Player 1 * 
Deliberation 
 -0.1925 0.0743 -0.3277 
  (0.1414) (0.3052) (0.2036) 
     
Comprehension   -0.1000  
   (0.1892)  
     
Deliberation * 
Comprehension 
  0.0796  
   (0.2517)  
     
Player 1 * 
Comprehension 
  -0.0016  
   (0.2576)  
     
Player 1 * 
Deliberation * 
Comprehension 
  -0.3581  
   (0.3442)  
     
Experience    0.1426 
    (0.1317) 
     
Deliberation * 
Experience 
   -0.1877 
    (0.2005) 
     
Player 1 * 
Experience 
   -0.4045** 
    (0.1930) 
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Player 1 * 
Deliberation * 
Experience 
   0.2316 
    (0.2800) 
     
_cons 0.3333*** 0.2917*** 0.3750** 0.2174** 
 (0.0491) (0.0663) (0.1749) (0.0879) 
N 187 187 187 187 
R2 0.004 0.014 0.049 0.050 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Data from the Pencil-and-paper study in the DIGSSCORE lab 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
The only effects that are statistically significant at conventional levels are found in the 
specification controlling for experience. This is just as predicted by the SHH. The estimated 
deliberation effect, however, is positive in our data. This is a noisy phenomenon, and doing 
many regressions will increase the probability of getting what looks like statistically significant 
results (Morgan and Rubin, 2012). 20 However, our results do not match the predictions from 
the SHH (Rand et al., 2014, Bear and Rand, 2016).  
The positive estimated treatment effect on cooperation increases when explicitly controlling for 
game experience, relative to no controls. This contrasts with the prediction from the SHH; that 
deliberation should have an unambiguous negative effect on cooperation, at least for 
unexperienced subjects (Rand et al., 2012, Rand et al., 2014, Rand, 2016, Bear and Rand, 2016). 
The lab data suggests that the positive deliberation effect is driven by the very people for whom 
the SHH predicts a negative effect.  
Importantly, the effects are imprecisely estimated, and could very well be just noise. Also, by 
conducting multiple tests, the probability of some being significant at the 5% level is above 5% 
(Morgan and Rubin, 2012). Hence, the data should not be used to draw conclusions, but should 
be analysed primarily as a pilot study prior to the NCP dataset, which is much more 
comprehensive. The lab findings suggest that this is a noisy phenomenon, so observation data 
is scarce. Therefore, in section 3.3, the lab data is pooled with the NCP data to gain more 
statistical power.  
Interestingly, there are big differences in predicted willingness to cooperate between player 1 
with and without experience. Experience has a positive, though not significant, coefficient. The 
                                                 
20 With k independent covariates, the chance of at least one covariate showing a “significant difference” between 
treatment and control groups, at significance level α, is 1 − (1 − α)k.  
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interaction between player 1 and experience gives a rather large negative coefficient, significant 
at the 5% level. Player 1 with no experience, however, cooperates much more than player 2, 
also significant at the 5% level. This could suggest that there might be some sort of moral 
deliberation effect for a player 2 who knows that the other has chosen to cooperate.  
In the pencil-and-paper lab experiment, there were three control questions at the end, to control 
whether the participants had understood the payoff-structure of the game. The variable 
comprehension in table 3.1.2 is a dummy, indicating that the subject has answered all three 
control questions correctly. Strømland et al. (2016) find that a time pressure effect on 
cooperation is conditional on payoff comprehension. Importantly, there are no significant 
differences in understanding between groups in our experiment. This is controlled with a 
regression of understanding on the player 1 dummy, deliberation and the interaction between 
them, presented in table 3.1.3. 
Table 3.1.3 Treatment effects on understanding. Linear probability model. 
 
 OLS (robust SE) 






Player 1 * 
Deliberation 







Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Controlling for heterogeneity in comprehension of the payoff-structure. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
None of the explanatory variables are statistically significant, so I cannot reject the null-
hypothesis of no difference in payoff comprehension across conditions.  
The most notable change in table 3.1.2 when controlling for understanding of the payoff-
structure, is the coefficient for the interaction between player 1, deliberation and 
comprehension. This coefficient is negative and quite large, as predicted by the SHH (Rand et 
al., 2014, Bear and Rand, 2016). It is however very imprecisely estimated, and far from 
significant at conventional levels.  The same goes for all other coefficients, except for the 
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interaction between player 1 and experience. Although still insignificant, it looks like 
controlling for understanding of the payoff-structure alters the estimated effects quite 
dramatically, as predicted by Strømland et al. (2016).  
Assume, for the sake of argument, that the deliberation treatment has a negative effect on 
cooperation for a comprehending, deliberating player 1. Even if this is the case, the SHH still 
does not explain the lack of a similar effect for player 2. Here, the same interaction is virtually 
zero, only slightly positive. If there is indeed an effect for a comprehending, deliberating player 
1, the present data suggests that this works through beliefs rather than preferences, just as 
Ellingsen et al. (2012) find for social framing effects. Player 2 knows, when making her 
decision, what player 1 has chosen. Therefore, there is no room for a treatment effect through 
beliefs in the second stage of the game.  
For the lab pilot, the main specification is the one estimating separate effects for player 1 and 
player 2, without controlling for comprehension and experience. This is the same specification 
as in the NCP; decided before conducting the experiment. This specification allows for a 
separation of a deliberation effect through preferences from an effect through beliefs. This 
specification gives no statistically significant coefficients.  
Interpreting a null-effect can be problematic, as the interpretation is ambiguous. One obvious 
interpretation of a null-effect is that there is simply no internal conflict between intuitive and 
deliberative thinking when deciding whether or not to cooperate with a stranger in a social 
dilemma. This is the scenario assumed by most microeconomic models trying to predict 
behaviour, e.g. Rabin (1993), Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Becker (1976) and Stigler & Becker 
(1977). Section 4 with discussion and concluding remarks contains a deeper discussion of 
interpretations. 
Results from the lab experiment are not conclusive, but they give a sense of what to expect from 
the NCP data. Power-analyses are conducted to estimate the sample sizes needed to confidently 
observe a deliberation effect. The power-graphs show estimated statistical power both for the 
specification where all knowledge is pooled into a single deliberation effect, and estimated 
separately for the two different players. Statistical power is measured as (1-β), where β is the 
probability of making a type 2 error (i.e. not rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false) 
(Verbeek, 2012, p. 31). In addition to estimated effect sizes from the lab data, some hypothetical 
effect sizes are included for comparison. The observed effect sizes from the lab experiment are 




Figure 3.1 Power for two-sample means test of general deliberation effect, assuming equal 
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Figure 3.2 Two-sample means test of deliberation effect on cooperation for player 1, assuming 
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Figure 3.3 Two-sample means test of deliberation effect on cooperation for player 2Y, assuming 
equal sample size in each treatment group.  No controls.  
What do the power graphs tell us? The power graph for the entire population (figure 3.1.) 
suggests that if we want to test for an overall effect of deliberation on cooperation, like predicted 
by the SHH, even the 1173 observations from the NCP may not be sufficient to get a satisfying 
level of statistical power. Importantly, the power-analyses hinge on the assumption that the 
effect size is correctly estimated in the lab pilot.  
Figure 3.2. shows statistical power for the estimated effect size for player 1. The estimated 
effect size is very small, and will demand thousands of observations to be precisely estimated, 
given that the effect size has been correctly estimated in the lab study. If the true effect sizes 
are larger or smaller than what has been estimated from the lab data, respectively less and more 
observation data is needed from the NCP to achieve an adequate level of statistical power. 
For player 2Y, the estimated effect size is quite large. If this is correctly estimated in the lab 
pilot, the NCP dataset presented in section 3.2 should provide enough power to detect a 
treatment effect for player 2Y. In the present thesis, this is the most interesting effect, as it 
measures the pure preference effect of the treatment.  
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3.2 Results from the Norwegian citizen panel 
In this section, I analyse the results from the NCP data. This contains the same experiment as 
in the lab pilot, but without control questions for understanding and experience, due to very 
limited space in the survey. The NCP data does, however, include response times, which are 
useful for testing whether the treatment worked as intended. Also, the NCP survey included all 
branches of the game tree, including the part where player 2 was told that player 1 had chosen 
to defect (i.e. the blue box). Players in this group are denoted player 2B.  
I start with a general deliberation effect on cooperation without controls, as was done with the 
data from the lab experiment. As before, this is a relevant test of the social heuristics hypothesis, 
which predicts that deliberation should give an unambiguous negative effect on cooperation for 
both player groups, at least for a subsample of subjects.  
The main specification is the one estimating separate effects for each player group, thus 
separating deliberation effects through preferences from effects through beliefs. Probit and logit 
regressions are presented in the appendix. Table 3.2.1 displays the treatment effects estimated 
with OLS. Player 2Y is the baseline. 
Table 3.2.1 Treatment effects on cooperation for subjects in the NCP. Linear probability model 
 
 No controls Separate effects 
for each player 
group 
Deliberation 0.0479 0.0473 
 (0.0297) (0.0509) 
   
Player 1  -0.0197 
  (0.0505) 
   
Player 2B  -0.2140*** 
  (0.0514) 
   
Player 1 * 
Deliberation 
 -0.0016 
  (0.0704) 
   
Player 2B * 
Deliberation 
 -0.0177 
  (0.0729) 
   
_cons 0.5253*** 0.6034*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0372) 
N 1126 1126 
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R2 0.002 0.042 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Effects estimated with OLS. Player 2B plays second move and knows that player 1 has chosen the blue box 
(defected) Player 2Y (i.e. player 2 who knows that player 1 has chosen the yellow box) is the baseline. Only data 
from the NCP 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The positive coefficient for deliberation lends no support to the SHH, and is more in line with 
the notion of a moral deliberation effect (Epley et al., 2006). With the observed coefficients and 
levels of significance however, it would be merely speculative to suggest that the NCP data 
support either of the theories. As was the case in the lab pilot, the estimated treatment effects 
are not significant at conventional levels.21 This is the same both in the main specification and 
for the regression where all knowledge is pooled into a general deliberation effect on 
cooperation.  
In the present NCP round, only unexperienced respondents were drawn for participation in the 
game studied, according to explicit instructions to external programmers. Experimental 
experience from other studies than the NCP is not controlled for.  
As was clear from the lab pilot, a deliberation effect, if present, can depend on many factors. It 
also appeared to vary a great deal between player groups. The specification to the right in table 
3.2.1 shows estimated deliberation effects and interactions on the different player groups, with 
player 2Y as the benchmark.  
There does not seem to be any significant difference in the willingness to cooperate between 
subjects assigned as Player 1 and those assigned as Player 2Y. The only statistically significant 
coefficient is that for player 2B; the ones who are told that player 1 defected. The negative and 
significant coefficient is not surprising, and merely confirms that there is probably an element 
of reciprocity in cooperation between strangers in a social dilemma (Rabin, 1993). After all, 
player 2B knows, at the time of the decision, that the other player has chosen the blue box (i.e. 
defect).  
The coefficient for the interaction between knowing that player 1 has defected, and getting the 
treatment (Player 2B * deliberation), is virtually zero. This indicates that, once controlling for 
knowing that the other player has defected (i.e. player 2B), there is no room for a treatment 
effect. This confirms the assumptions made when deciding to exclude this branch of the game 
tree from the lab pilot. Few people would choose to give away all the (potential to earn) money 
                                                 
21 The point estimates in NCP have smaller magnitude than those in the pilot. This might just be because of the 
larger sample size. 
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to the other player, when the other player has already shown him- or herself as a defector. None 
of the other variables have significant estimated effects either. Baseline cooperation in the NCP 
is 60 %, which is relatively high, but within normal, given that the baseline is the case where 
player 2 knows that player 1 has cooperated (Ledyard, 1995, Chaudhuri, 2011).  
Both specifications in table 3.2.1 show no statistically significant effect of the deliberation 
treatment, and thus no support for the SHH. However, the exact interpretation of a null-effect 
is ambiguous, as several mechanisms could explain a null-effect. For example, did the treatment 
fail to induce deliberation? Is there a selection problem in missing responses? Did too many 
subjects misunderstand the instructions or the payoff-structure? Although there were no 
questions to control for comprehension, the text data may shed some light on whether the 
subjects have understood the game or not. It may also tell us something about subjects’ 
motivation for their choices.  
3.2.1 Treatment compliance, comprehension and missing responses 
Going through the text data from the Norwegian citizen panel, I have divided the written 
justifications into five categories, in accordance with the motivation expressed in writing. The 
“Other”-category includes responses which just state for example “Blue box”, or that lack a 
clear interpretation. The categorization is done in a very ad hoc way, especially since the 
answers are anonymized, and thus cannot be connected to actual choices. Hence, the descriptive 
statistics in table 3.2.2 should be interpreted with extreme caution. Note also that what the 
subjects have written, does not necessarily reflect their true motivation.  
Table 3.2.2 Categorization of answers from subjects in the treatment groups. 
 
Equality Reciprocity Selfish optimization Misunderstood Other 
Subjects: 228 12 83 73 69 
Percent: 48,93 % 2,58 % 17,81 % 15,67 % 14,81 % 
 
Looking at the answers given, some tendencies materialize: Almost half of the subjects in the 
NCP state equality or fairness as the primary motivation for their choice. In many cases this is 
hard to separate from reciprocity. Also, some answers may be artefacts of demand effects. One 
might speculate that the way the treatment was conducted led subjects to make the decision 
they felt was easiest to justify. It is, however, not clear which direction this would “nudge” the 
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subjects. Subjects might also act differently if they do not believe that they are anonymous, or 
if they believe that what they write will be read. 
The most disturbing number in table 3.2.2, is the share of subjects writing something that 
indicates they have clearly misinterpreted the payoff-structure, or the game altogether. Still, as 
long as there is a control group and a treatment group, and there is no selection bias in 
understanding, differences in understanding will not cause inconsistent predictions. However, 
misunderstanding could increase the number of random responses and make the data noisier. 
This could be part of an explanation for a null-effect, and is an important reason why more 
observation data is needed.  
The text data from the NCP shows that 117 out of 582; that is 20% of all participants in the 
treatment groups, skipped the writing altogether. This is a lower treatment compliance than we 
hoped for, and clearly shows that there are some significant differences between a lab study and 
a web based survey. Still, 80% compliance is much higher than what can be expected from 
studies with time pressure on this subject (Tinghög et al., 2013, Bouwmeester et al., 2017) (see 
e.g. Rand et al. (2012)).  
Importantly, there does not seem to be any significant differences in compliance to treatment 
between player groups in the NCP, so heterogeneity between groups should not be a problem.22 
On the actual cooperation decision, the response rate was 96%, with no statistically significant 
differences between the treated and the control group. Regressions controlling for selection in 
missing responses are presented in table 3.2.4.  
The 47 observations with missing response on at least one question, are dropped from the 
regressions. I do not have access to the subject ID numbers for the written justifications for 
each player; they are anonymized. As already pointed out, treatment compliance is about 80%, 
and virtually the same for all player groups. This is important to the validity of the treatment. 
While low compliance makes the estimates noisier, selection bias in compliance would have 
had more dramatic effects on estimated treatment effects.  
 
 
                                                 
22 Treated groups had following treatment compliance rates: Player 1: 82%. Player 2Y: 81%. Player 2B: 76%. 
Numbers are calculated for all players assigned the respective groups. 
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Table 3.2.3 Descriptive statistics from the NCP data 
Number of respondents by groups 
 Player 1 Player 2B Player 2Y Total 
Control 209 190 174 573 
Treatment 197 167 189 553 
Total 406 357 363 1126 
Only subjects who answered the questions completely. 
Since the text data are anonymized, I cannot know whether the same subjects skipped both the 
decision and the written justification. With data connecting the written justification and the 
cooperation decision, one could use treatment as an instrument variable to estimate treatment 
effect on the treated. In the present case, since treatment is randomized, it seems plausible that 
the instrument (deliberation treatment) affects the dependent variable (cooperation) only 
through the instrumented variable (giving a written justification) (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). 
Thus, being in the treatment group works as an instrument for giving a written response. 
Hopefully, this connection between text data and cooperation decisions will be feasible in later 
datasets.  
The concern is that the same subjects skip both the decision and the written justification. If this 
is the case, there is a selection problem. What we measure is not really the effect of the 
treatment, but the effect of “intention-to-treat”. If there is a selection bias in missing responses, 
the difference can be substantial. If missing responses are (approximately) uniformly 
distributed between treatment groups, the difference is negligible. Doing a regression on 
missing response; propensity to drop out, it is possible to estimate whether or not there is a 









Table 3.2.4 Linear regression on propensity to drop out. 
 
 OLS (robust SE) OLS (robust SE)  
Player 1 
control 
-0.0146   
 (0.0163)   
    
Player 1 
treatment 
0.0104   
 (0.0196)   
    
Player 2B 
control 
0.0071   
 (0.0194)   
    
Player 2B 
treatment 
0.0285   
 (0.0225)   
    
Player 2Y 
treatment 
0.0121   
 (0.0200)   
    
Treatment  0.0194*  
  (0.0115)  
    
_cons 0.0333** 0.0305***  
 (0.0134) (0.0071)  
N 1173 1173  
R2 0.004 0.002  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Measuring the impact of treatment, and on specific player group, on propensity to drop out. In the regression on 
all player groups, player 2Y in the control group is the baseline. Player 2B plays second move and knows that 
player 1 has chosen the blue box (defected) Player 2Y is player 2 who knows that player 1 has chosen the yellow 
box). 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Regressing missing response only on treatment, gives a coefficient which is statistically 
significant at the 10% level, although the magnitude of the coefficient sows doubt about real 
significance. In the main regression, estimating separate effects for the different player groups, 
there are no statistically significant coefficients. As in the other regressions, player 2Y in the 
control group is used as baseline.23 Considering both the magnitude of the coefficient, and the 
                                                 
23 Using player 1 in the control group as baseline, player 2B in the control group gets a coefficient of 0.043 
(P=0.035), but this is hardly a theoretically relevant comparison.  
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P-value compared to the number of regressions conducted, it seems safe to assume there is no 
(serious) selection problem in missing responses (Morgan and Rubin, 2012).  
3.2.2 Response times 
Was the deliberation treatment successful in inducing a deliberative mindset? A significant 
advantage with the NCP dataset compared to pencil-and-paper experiments, except from being 
quite comprehensive, is that we have access to response times for the decision for all subjects. 
Adding the time taken by the treatment group to give a written justification for their decision, 
to the time taken to choose between the boxes, and comparing this to the decision time in the 
control group, one gets an indication of whether or not the deliberation treatment worked as 
intended. If total response time increased significantly with the treatment, one can be relatively 
confident that the treatment had the desired effect (Rand et al., 2012, Rand, 2016). Therefore, 
it is important to test the effect of the deliberation treatment on response time. Table 3.2.5 shows 
the effect, estimated with OLS, of the treatment on total response time, measured in seconds. 
Table 3.2.5 Effect of deliberation treatment on response time in seconds. 
 
 Player 1 Player 2Y Player 2B 
Deliberation 61.1141*** 62.3544*** 65.1933*** 
 (7.1217) (8.4491) (9.2993) 
    
_cons 88.8038*** 95.4382*** 108.0102*** 
 (4.9478) (6.0555) (6.3575) 
N 404 366 368 
R2 0.155 0.130 0.118 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Shows the effect of the deliberation treatment on response time measured in seconds. Subjects taking more than 
10 minutes are excluded as outliers. For the control group, I consider the time taken to make the decision between 
the two boxes. For the treatment group, I consider the total time spend on the written justification and the decision 
between the two boxes combined. Data from the NCP. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
To prevent the coefficients from being inflated by participants leaving their computers in the 
middle of the survey to have dinner,24 the regressions are run only for participants with a total 
response time less than 10 minutes. Including all participants, gives estimated treatment effects 
that are clearly artefacts of a few extreme outliers. The cut-off time of 10 minutes was chosen 
visually as a natural cut-off in response times. Other cut-offs were also considered; the results 
                                                 
24 Or go on vacation. A few participants exceeded response times of 100 000 seconds, and one managed a total 
response time of over one million seconds; just short of twelve days.  
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are quite sensitive to the choice of cut-off time. However, the tendencies are the same for all 
reasonable exclusions.25  
Choosing a specific cut-off time, is a common way to deal with extreme right outliers (Ratcliff, 
1993, Whelan, 2008). A problem with the method is the lack of a clear, general rule for the cut-
off (Whelan, 2008). Log-transforming response times is another way to minimize the effects of 
outliers, and make the distribution closer to normal, without losing observations (Ratcliff, 1993, 
Whelan, 2008, Wooldridge, 2014, p. 157, 264-269).26 The histograms in figure 3.4. show the 
distributions of the natural log of response time in seconds. It is evident from the histograms, 
that the deliberation groups have more density towards longer response time than the control 
groups. Whether the differences are large enough to compensate for the extra task is an open 
question.  
  
Figure 3.4 Log of response time in seconds. One histogram for each group of players. 
                                                 
25 Table 3.2.5A in appendix A shows the estimated effects of the treatment on the natural log of response times, 
without excluding outliers. Results are similar to those in table 3.2.5. 
26 Taking the natural log is a monotonic transformation; hence keeping the ordering of values unchanged. Log-
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The effects of the treatment on response time are sensitive to cut-off time, but the estimated 
coefficients are large and highly significant for all player groups. This may not be so surprising, 
as the treatment group is asked to do an extra task. Using response time as a proxy for 
deliberation is in accordance with earlier research (Rand et al., 2012, Cone and Rand, 2014, 
Rand, 2016), albeit controversial (Myrseth and Wollbrant, 2015). It is believed that writing 
down a justification for a decision of whether to cooperate or not, is likely to stimulate to 
increased deliberation.  
If there are (probably) no selection problems in treatment compliance or missing responses, and 
the treatment appears to have worked as intended, how should we interpret the null-effect? In 
addition to the possibility that cognitive modes do not affect preferences for cooperation in 
social dilemmas, there is a very real possibility that we simply do not have enough statistical 
power to detect the effect.  
In section 3.3, the NCP data is combined with the data from the lab experiment to get a pooled 
analysis, with more statistical power. 
3.3 Pooled analysis 
Pooling the data from the lab experiment and the NCP survey gives a comprehensive dataset, 
covering the same social dilemma. All questions were formulated in a very similar way; the 
main difference being the payoff-structure. In the lab experiment, the participants were told that 
if both cooperated, they would earn 210 NOK each. If one cooperated and one defected, the 
defector would earn 300 NOK, while the co-operator would earn the minimum guaranteed sum 
of 100 NOK. If both defected, they would both earn 120 NOK. In the NCP survey, both 
cooperating, would earn both players 1000 NOK, both defecting would earn both 500 NOK, 
and one defecting and one cooperating would give 1500 NOK to the defector and 0 to the co-
operator. However, in the NCP, only four people were randomly drawn to receive payment. 
Thus, the payoff in the two experiments was not identical, but the relative desirability of 
scenarios similar.  
Running the linear probability regression on the entire pooled dataset, both with a general 
deliberation effect, and with the specification estimating separate effects for the first- and 




Table 3.3.1 Treatment effects on cooperation. Pooled analysis with OLS 
 
 No controls Separate effects 
for each player 
group 
Deliberation 0.0497* 0.0698 
 (0.0273) (0.0452) 
   
Lab -0.1858*** -0.2529*** 
 (0.0381) (0.0393) 
   
Player 1  0.0013 
  (0.0449) 
   
Player 2B  -0.2013*** 
  (0.0490) 
   
Player 1 * 
Deliberation 
 -0.0394 
  (0.0629) 
   
Player 2B * 
Deliberation 
 -0.0401 
  (0.0690) 
   
_cons 0.5244*** 0.5907*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0338) 
N 1313 1313 
R2 0.019 0.053 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Player 2B plays second move and knows that player 1 has chosen the blue box (defected) Player 2Y (i.e. player 2 
who knows that player 1 has chosen the yellow box) is the baseline. 
Data from both the NCP and the lab experiment 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Lab is a dummy equal to one for the participants in the lab experiment. Overall cooperation is 
substantially higher in the NCP survey than in the lab study. One possible explanation is the 
weaker incentives in the NCP. Although the relative desirability of the alternative outcomes are 
properly incentivized, the expected payoff in all scenarios are a fraction of that in the lab 
experiment. Rabin (1993) argues that preferences for fairness and reciprocity compete against 
preferences for material payoff, and thus will be more pronounced when material incentives are 
weaker. This could to some extent explain the huge difference in levels of cooperation, in an 
otherwise identically framed game.  
Selection might also be an issue. The subjects in the lab experiment were mostly students, some 
of whom might see economic experiments only as an easy way to earn some cash. This 
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explanation is more speculative, although easily follows from Rabin’s model if adding the 
common assumption of diminishing marginal utility of money. Also, sample differences do not 
devalue the results, as it is the treatment effects we are interested in, not levels of cooperation.  
The overall estimated (without controls) deliberation effect is positive, and significant at the 
10% level, contradicting the predictions of the SHH. Again: When running so many regressions, 
some are bound to be statistically significant by conventional levels (Morgan and Rubin, 2012). 
The results should therefore be interpreted with great caution. When allowing player group 
differences, the estimated deliberation effect is no longer statistically significant at conventional 
levels, but the magnitude of the coefficient for deliberation is somewhat larger.  
Table 3.3.2 shows both individual datasets, as well as the pooled dataset, all analysed using 
OLS. The regression presented, is the one estimating the model separately for player 1 and 
player 2 (i.e. separating the effect through preferences from the effect through beliefs). As 
before, player 2Y is the benchmark.  
Table 3.3.2 Treatment effects on cooperation. Comparison estimated with OLS 
 
 Pooled NCP Lab 
Deliberation 0.0698 0.0473 0.1551 
 (0.0452) (0.0509) (0.0989) 
    
Lab -0.2529***   
 (0.0393)   
    
Player 1 0.0013 -0.0197 0.0861 
 (0.0449) (0.0505) (0.0987) 
    
Player 2B -0.2013*** -0.2140***  
 (0.0490) (0.0514)  
    
Player 1* 
Deliberation 
-0.0394 -0.0016 -0.1925 
 (0.0629) (0.0704) (0.1414) 
    
Player 2B* 
Deliberation 
-0.0401 -0.0177  
 (0.0690) (0.0729)  
    
_cons 0.5907*** 0.6034*** 0.2917*** 
 (0.0338) (0.0372) (0.0663) 
N 1313 1126 187 
R2 0.053 0.042 0.014 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Player 2B plays second move and knows that player 1 has chosen the blue box (defected) Player 2Y (i.e. player 2 
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who knows that player 1 has chosen the yellow box) is the baseline. 
Data from both the NCP and the lab experiment 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Although not statistically significant, there are tendencies towards a treatment effect that is 
positive for player 2Y, and negative both for player 2B and for player 1. While the SHH predicts 
a negative deliberation effect for all groups, the negative coefficient for the interaction between 
player 1 and the deliberation treatment could also be explained as reactive egoism (Epley et al., 
2006). The positive (though not significant) estimated treatment effect for player 2Y, might be 
interpreted as a moral response to a reciprocity norm (Rabin, 1993, Falk and Fischbacher, 
2006). Knowing that the other has defected has a large, and not surprisingly, negative effect on 
cooperation.  
The most interesting numbers are the coefficients for Deliberation and the interactions between 
Deliberation and the dummy for player 1. Neither of these coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. The deliberation effect for player 2Y is positive in the individual datasets, 
as well as in the pooled dataset, albeit well within two standard deviations from zero. Thus, the 
results presented here lend no support to the social heuristics hypothesis, and merely indicative 
support to the hypothesis of reactive egoism paired with moral deliberation (Epley et al., 2006).  
The magnitude of the estimated effect of the deliberation treatment on cooperation for player 
2Y, suggests there is need for follow-up studies with more data. From the present data, the 
effect size is estimated to be between 4,7 and 15,5%.27 If this is a real population effect, the 





                                                 
27 Depending on which regression specification is used, and if looking at the datasets pooled or individually. 
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4 Discussion and conclusion 
4.1 General discussion 
The data presented in this thesis show no statistically significant deliberation effect on 
cooperation. This does not necessarily mean that the deliberation treatment has no effect on the 
subjects’ decision making. If a sizable portion of the subject pool have experience with similar 
experiments, or are otherwise used to a competitive environment, one might not be able to 
observe a deliberation effect (Rand et al., 2012, Rand and Nowak, 2013, Rand et al., 2014, Bear 
and Rand, 2016). In the pilot, this is specifically tested for, and the results give no support to 
the SHH’s explanation. 
In a general regression of deliberation on cooperation, opposing effects through preferences 
and beliefs might cancel each other out. Thus, observing a null-effect with this specification, 
could mean that there is a negative effect though beliefs and a positive effect through 
preferences. This scenario is partly described by Epley et. al. (2006), where subjects, knowing 
that the other player has chosen to cooperate with them, follow a reciprocity norm, strengthened 
by their reflection and deliberation. This promotes cooperation. When uncertain of the other’s 
decision however, like in the case of player 1, deliberation prompts perspective taking. 
Perspective taking then brings about mistrust towards the other player, resulting in reactive 
egoism (Epley et al., 2006, Torsvik et al., 2011). 
Epley et al. (2006) find that subjects cooperate more when they know that the other players 
have cooperated, but do not explicitly suggest the moral deliberation in their theory. Instead, 
they focus solely on the effects on perspective taking when there is no information about others’ 
decisions (Epley et al., 2006). They find that, when uncertain about the decisions of others, 
perspective taking increases taking. Torsvik et al. (2011) find similar effects of announcing 
post-play face-to-face discussions between participants in a PGG. This is interpreted as effects 
of perspective taking and empirical expectations. Our results suggest that the same goes for a 
deliberation treatment. The hypothesis developed by Epley et al., seems fully compatible with 
different deliberation effects conditional on what sort of knowledge one possesses when making 
the choice between cooperation and defection.  
A moral deliberation effect is also on par with earlier research on perspective taking, and 
assumed to be the main benefit of taking others’ perspective in social interactions (Neale and 
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Bazerman, 1983, Batson, 1995, Galinsky and Moskowitz, 2000, Savitsky et al., 2005, Epley et 
al., 2006). 
Reactive egoism can give the same results as those predicted by the SHH; namely less 
cooperation. However, in SHH, the effect of cognitive processes on cooperation is claimed to 
go through preferences for cooperation, rather than beliefs (Rand et al., 2012). A moral or 
reciprocal deliberation effect has (to my knowledge) no firm theoretical footing, but would 
contradict the SHH. 
The SHH states that the reason we should observe a deliberation effect is that people tend to 
over-use heuristics that work well in familiar situations. People who have experience with lab 
experiments might have formed a distinct set of heuristics about what kind of behaviour is likely 
to be beneficial in the lab. If so, they are likely to use these heuristics the next time they find 
themselves in a lab experiment, instead of extrapolating heuristics from situations that do not 
well resemble a one-shot economic game (Rand et al., 2014, Bear and Rand, 2016). One will 
likely observe similar results for people who are used to competitive environments where 
cooperation is generally not a good strategy (Rand et al., 2014). This may be the case for 
economics students, who have learned to recognise an economic game when they see it, and to 
find and play the Nash-equilibria. 
Observing a treatment effect in the second part of the game (i.e. for player 2) would suggest 
that the treatment, through increased deliberation, alters the subjects’ preferences for 
cooperation. Since player 2 already knows what player 1 has chosen, the is no room for changes 
in her beliefs. SHH predicts a decreased rate of observed cooperation, following from increased 
deliberation (Rand et al., 2012, Rand et al., 2014). If we had observed such an effect for player 
2, the SHH would explain this as self-interested cognition; or system two thinking (Chaiken 
and Trope, 1999, Kahneman, 2003, Kahneman, 2011), overruling a more cooperative and 
benevolent intuition. There is, at least to my knowledge, no reason to believe that a deliberation 
effect through preferences would work differently on player 1 and player 2 when treatment 
groups are randomized.  
The novel interpretation of a null-effect in the regression specification not allowing player 
group differences, is that the treatment affects player 1 and player 2 differently. If deliberation 
works through the players’ beliefs, as is suggested to be the case for framing effects (Ellingsen 
et al., 2012), we would expect an effect only for player 1. If, on the other hand, the treatment 
works through preferences for cooperation, this should affect both players.  
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There are several theories suggesting that moral preferences, inequity aversion and reciprocity 
might be of some importance to the observed level of cooperation, e.g. Rabin (1993), Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), Epley et al. (2006), Falk and Fischbacher (2006). Importantly, if deliberation 
has opposing effects through beliefs and preferences, the effects might cancel out in a general 
regression of cooperation on deliberation.  
Results from the main specification in the present study lend no support to the possibility that 
a deliberation treatment has opposing effects though preferences and beliefs. When estimating 
different effects in different player groups, I find no statistically significant deliberation effects. 
Nor do the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients suggest any real significance. Thus, the 
most obvious interpretation of the present data is that there simply is no internal conflict 
between intuitive and deliberative decision making in a social dilemma with strangers. At least, 
the effect is not big enough to be precisely estimated with the statistical power available in this 
study. 
An alternative interpretation of a null-effects is that the treatment did not work well enough, 
given the statistical power available. This could be because the general degree of deliberation 
was too high in the control groups. All participants had time to reflect and deliberate their 
decision, so it might be the case that too few relied enough on their intuition when deciding 
which box to tick off, i.e. to cooperate or defect. In the NCP survey, all subjects had unlimited 
time, as opposed to earlier studies, where intuition groups often have maximum 10 seconds 
(Rand et al., 2012, Tinghög et al., 2013, Rand, 2016). 
It seems likely that the treatment in the present study induced reflective, deliberative thinking 
in the treatment groups, at least considering the relatively high rate of compliance to the 
treatment. One might suspect however, that most participants in the control group were also in 
a reflective state of mind. If this is the case, then the treatment will not lead to a significant 
difference in cognitive mode, at least considered within a dual-process-framework a la 
Kahneman (2003, 2011) and Chaiken & Trope (1999) where “choice” of cognitive subsystem 
is discrete rather than continuous. 
Ideally, I would also control for understanding and for experience from experimental settings 
in the NCP data. This was not possible in the present data due to lack of space, but will hopefully 
be included in later datasets from the Norwegian and Swedish citizen panels. As we did not get 
enough space to control for understanding, we have no way of knowing if the subjects in the 
NCP understood the game properly, other than indications from the written replies. This is a 
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problem if the deliberation effect is conditional on understanding, as claimed by Strømland et 
al. (2016) and Bear and Rand (2016). The findings from the lab experiment also indicate that a 
deliberation effect, if present, could be conditional on understanding. If many subjects in the 
NCP misunderstood the questions or the payoff structure, this could help explain a null-effect 
and imprecise estimates. The theoretical foundation for a deliberation effect on cooperation 
which is contingent on misunderstanding, is weak at best.  
Whether the treatment worked as intended or not, is an issue which is much harder to test for. 
Clearly, deliberation and intuition are individual specific processes, and the time required for 
one individual to make a well thought out, deliberative response to a question, is not necessarily 
the same as for another. Using response time as a proxy for deliberation, the treatment appears 
to have worked well. 
Not using time pressure as a treatment, meant all the subjects were given (potentially) the same 
amount of time to choose between the blue and the yellow boxes. Thus, they all had the same 
time to deliberate their decision.  If average level of deliberation was very high in the control 
group, this will diminish the chances of being able to precisely estimate a treatment effect. 
An important question is whether the treatment could affect the subjects in other ways than just 
by promoting more deliberation. With time pressure, there is the problem that the treatment 
group might experience more stress, which is not the same as acting intuitively. With our 
deliberation treatment, some subjects may experience a demand effect, and may think that they 
are supposed to cooperate. One indication that this might be the case, is that so many 
respondents in the NCP state equality and fairness as the motivation for their decision. Even 
some of those who know that the other player has chosen the blue box, write that they will 
choose the blue box themselves “because it is fair that both get the same amount”. As is almost 
always the case, it is impossible to distinct demand effects from an actual desire to cooperate. 
The phrase “Whatever the other person chooses, you will earn most by choosing the blue box” 






4.2 Concluding remarks 
I find no statistically significant evidence that increased deliberation changes the willingness to 
cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma, neither through preferences, nor through beliefs. Thus, I find 
no support for the social heuristics hypothesis (SHH). If anything, the results presented in this 
thesis seem to suggest some support for reactive egoism, paired with a moral deliberation effect 
promoting reciprocity, as suggested by Epley et al. (2006). However, the evidence are not 
conclusive, and should be interpreted with caution. Given that we may have underestimated the 
statistical power using the data from the pilot study, more data is needed to conclude. 
With so much evidence for the SHH coming from time pressure studies (Rand, 2016), the 
results presented in the present thesis could suggest these evidences are artefacts of the 
treatment. Perhaps time pressure causes stress rather than intuition? To properly control for this 
explanation, a follow-up study could include both intuition priming and deliberation priming, 
or time pressure and time delay, in addition to a control group as baseline. This sort of two-way 
treatment could also help deciding whether most subjects in cooperation experiments are 
making relatively intuitive or deliberative decisions.  
As already pointed out, in the present study, one possible explanation for a null-effect is simply 
that the level of deliberation is so high in the control group that there is little room left for a 
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Appendix A – Probit and logit tables 
Table 3.1.2A Marginal effects on cooperation in the lab pilot. Probit estimation 
 
 No controls Separate effects 






Deliberation 0.0602 0.1539 0.0800 0.2570* 
 (0.0698) (0.0964) (0.2051) (0.1440) 
     
Player 1  0.0880 0.0737 0.2808** 
  (0.0994) (0.2121) (0.1352) 
     
Player 1 * 
Treatment 
 -0.1910 0.0668 -0.3217* 
  (0.1377) (0.2773) (0.1895) 
     
Comprehension   -0.1006  
   (0.1792)  
     
Deliberation * 
Comprehension 
  0.0820  
   (0.2323)  
     
Player 1 * 
Comprehension 
  0.0057  
   (0.2392)  
     
Player 1 * 
Deliberation * 
Comprehension 
  -0.3529  
   (0.3170)  
     
Experience    0.1519 
    (0.1387) 
     
Deliberation * 
Experience 
   -0.1929 
    (0.1924) 
     
Player 1 * 
Experience 
   -0.4080** 
    (0.1927) 
     
Player 1 * 
Deliberation * 




    (0.2789) 
N 187 187 187 187 
R2     
Standard errors in parentheses 
Data from the Pencil-and-paper study in the DIGSSCORE lab 




Table 3.1.2B Marginal effect of deliberation on cooperation. Logit estimation 
 
 No controls Separate effects 






Deliberation 0.0602 0.1537 0.0785 0.2583* 
 (0.0698) (0.0963) (0.2017) (0.1459) 
     
Player 1  0.0886 0.0723 0.2815** 
  (0.1001) (0.2085) (0.1374) 
     
Player 1 * 
Treatment 
 -0.1908 0.0651 -0.3215* 
  (0.1374) (0.2724) (0.1887) 
     
Comprehension   -0.1009  
   (0.1781)  
     
Deliberation * 
Comprehension 
  0.0828  
   (0.2292)  
     
Player 1 * 
Comprehension 
  0.0076  
   (0.2364)  
     
Player 1 * 
Deliberation * 
Comprehension 
  -0.3523  
   (0.3129)  
     
Experience    0.1550 
    (0.1425) 
     
Deliberation * 
Experience 
   -0.1951 
    (0.1930) 
     
Player 1 * 
Experience 
   -0.4106** 
    (0.1957) 
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Player 1 * 
Deliberation * 
Experience 
   0.2235 
    (0.2829) 
N 187 187 187 187 
R2     
Standard errors in parentheses 
Data from the Pencil-and-paper study in the DIGSSCORE lab 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 3.1.3A Marginal effects on understanding in the lab pilot. Probit estimation 
 Probit ME (SE) 












Standard errors in parentheses 
Controlling for heterogeneity in comprehension of the payoff-structure. 




Table 3.1.3B Marginal effects on understanding in the lab pilot. Logit estimation 
 Logit ME (SE) 












Standard errors in parentheses 
Controlling for heterogeneity in comprehension of the payoff-structure. 





Table 3.2.1A Marginal effects on cooperation for subjects in the NCP. Probit estimation. 
 
 No controls Separate effects 
for each player 
group 
Deliberation 0.0479 0.0479 
 (0.0295) (0.0514) 
   
Player 1  -0.0195 
  (0.0498) 
   
Player 2B  -0.2079*** 
  (0.0498) 
   
Player 1 * 
Deliberation 
 -0.0024 
  (0.0706) 
   
Player 2B * 
Deliberation 
 -0.0186 
  (0.0727) 
N 1126 1126 
R2   
Standard errors in parentheses 
Player 2B plays second move and knows that player 1 has chosen the blue box (defected) Player 2Y (i.e. player 2 
who knows that player 1 has chosen the yellow box) is the baseline. 
Effects measured with Probit. Only data from NCP 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 3.2.1B Marginal effects on cooperation for subjects in the NCP. Logit estimation. 
 
 No controls Separate effects 
for each player 
group 
Deliberation 0.0479 0.0481 
 (0.0295) (0.0515) 
   
Player 1  -0.0194 
  (0.0496) 
   
Player 2B  -0.2063*** 
  (0.0495) 
   
Player 1 * 
Deliberation 
 -0.0026 
  (0.0707) 
   





  (0.0727) 
N 1126 1126 
R2   
Standard errors in parentheses 
Player 2B plays second move and knows that player 1 has chosen the blue box (defected) Player 2Y (i.e. player 2 
who knows that player 1 has chosen the yellow box) is the baseline. 
Effects measured with Logit. Only data from NCP 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 3.2.4A Marginal effects on propensity to drop out. Probit estimation 
 




 (0.0232)  




 (0.0202)  




 (0.0206)  




 (0.0200)  




 (0.0203)  
   
Treatment  0.0195* 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Measuring the impact of treatment, and on specific player group, on propensity to drop out. In the regression on 
all player groups, player 2Y in the control group is the baseline. Player 2B plays second move and knows that 
player 1 has chosen the blue box (defected) Player 2Y is player 2 who knows that player 1 has chosen the yellow 
box). 













Table 3.2.4B Marginal effects on propensity to drop out. Logit estimation 




 (0.0252)  




 (0.0206)  




 (0.0211)  




 (0.0201)  




 (0.0206)  
   
Treatment  0.0197 
  (0.0120) 
N 1173 1173 
R2   
Standard errors in parentheses 
Measuring the impact of treatment, and on specific player group, on propensity to drop out. In the regression on 
all player groups, player 2Y in the control group is the baseline. Player 2B plays second move and knows that 
player 1 has chosen the blue box (defected) Player 2Y is player 2 who knows that player 1 has chosen the yellow 
box). 




Table 3.2.5A Effect of deliberation treatment on log of response time in seconds. OLS 
estimation 
 
 Player 1 Player 2Y Player 2B 
Deliberation 0.5915*** 0.6150*** 0.4531*** 
 (0.0943) (0.1204) (0.0673) 
    
_cons 4.4216*** 4.4917*** 4.5467*** 
 (0.0661) (0.0869) (0.0463) 
N 419 376 374 
R2 0.086 0.065 0.109 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Shows the effect of the deliberation treatment on the natural log of response time. For the control group, I consider 
the time taken to make the decision between the two boxes. For the treatment group, I consider the total time spent 
on both the written justification and the decision between the two boxes. Data from the NCP 




Table 3.3.1A Marginal effects on cooperation. Pooled analysis with probit 
 
 No controls Separate effects 
for each player 
group 
Deliberation 0.0497* 0.0705 
 (0.0272) (0.0455) 
   
Lab -0.1859*** -0.2470*** 
 (0.0386) (0.0381) 
   
Player 1  0.0016 
  (0.0446) 
   
Player 2B  -0.1944*** 
  (0.0478) 




  (0.0631) 




  (0.0686) 
N 1313 1313 
R2   
Standard errors in parentheses 
Player 2B plays second move and knows that player 1 has chosen the blue box (defected) Player 2Y (i.e. player 2 
who knows that player 1 has chosen the yellow box) is the baseline. 
Data from both the NCP and the lab experiment 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 3.3.1B Marginal effects on cooperation. Pooled analysis with logit 
 
 No controls Separate effects 
for each player 
group 
Deliberation 0.0496* 0.0706 
 (0.0272) (0.0456) 
   
Lab -0.1859*** -0.2453*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0378) 
   
Player 1  0.0013 
  (0.0445) 
   
Player 2B  -0.1928*** 
52 
 
  (0.0474) 




  (0.0631) 




  (0.0685) 
N 1313 1313 
R2   
Standard errors in parentheses 
Player 2B plays second move and knows that player 1 has chosen the blue box (defected) Player 2Y (i.e. player 2 
who knows that player 1 has chosen the yellow box) is the baseline. 
Data from both the NCP and the lab experiment 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 3.3.2A Marginal effects on cooperation. Comparison estimated with probit 
 
 Pooled NCP Lab 
Deliberation 0.0705 0.0479 0.1539 
 (0.0455) (0.0514) (0.0964) 
    
Lab -0.2470***   
 (0.0381)   
    
Player 1 0.0016 -0.0195 0.0880 
 (0.0446) (0.0498) (0.0994) 
    
Player 2B -0.1944*** -0.2079***  
 (0.0478) (0.0498)  
    
Player 1* 
Deliberation 
-0.0402 -0.0024 -0.1910 
 (0.0631) (0.0706) (0.1377) 
    
Player 2B* 
Deliberation 
-0.0412 -0.0186  
 (0.0686) (0.0727)  
N 1313 1126 187 
R2    
Standard errors in parentheses 
Player 2B plays second move and knows that player 1 has chosen the blue box (defected) Player 2Y (i.e. player 2 
who knows that player 1 has chosen the yellow box) is the baseline. 
Data from both the NCP and the lab experiment 




Table 3.3.2B Marginal effects on cooperation. Comparison estimated with logit 
 
 Pooled NCP Lab 
Deliberation 0.0706 0.0481 0.1537 
 (0.0456) (0.0515) (0.0963) 
    
Lab -0.2453***   
 (0.0378)   
    
Player 1 0.0013 -0.0194 0.0886 
 (0.0445) (0.0496) (0.1001) 
    
Player 2B -0.1928*** -0.2063***  
 (0.0474) (0.0495)  
    
Player 1* 
Deliberation 
-0.0402 -0.0026 -0.1908 
 (0.0631) (0.0707) (0.1374) 
    
Player 2B* 
Deliberation 
-0.0415 -0.0188  
 (0.0685) (0.0727)  
N 1313 1126 187 
R2    
Standard errors in parentheses 
Player 2B plays second move and knows that player 1 has chosen the blue box (defected) Player 2Y (i.e. player 2 
who knows that player 1 has chosen the yellow box) is the baseline. 
Data from both the NCP and the lab experiment 














Appendix B – Instruction sheet for the lab pilot 
 
Instrukser 
Vi ønsker å forstå hvordan folk oppfører seg i økonomiske valgsituasjoner og vil be deg om å 
ta én anonym beslutning.  Ingen kan finne ut hvilken beslutning du tar. 
Du og en annen tilfeldig person kan velge mellom gul eller blå boks. Betalingen din avhenger 
av valgene som tas: 
Hvis begge velger den gule boksen får dere 210 kr hver. Hvis du velger blå og den andre velger 
gul får du 300 kr og den andre får 100. Hvis begge velger den blå får dere 120 kr hver.   


















Appendix C - Instruction sheet for the Norwegian Citizen panel 
Vi er opptatt av å forstå hvordan folk oppfører seg i økonomiske valgsituasjoner. Vi vil derfor 
be deg om å ta én anonym beslutning hvor du kan trekkes til å motta penger. 
Du og en annen tilfeldig person kan velge mellom en gul eller blå boks. 
 
Hvis begge velger den gule boksen får dere 1000 kroner hver. Hvis du velger blå og den andre 
gul får du 1500 kroner og den andre får 0 kroner. Hvis begge velger blå får dere 500 kroner 
hver. Uansett hva den andre gjør tjener du mest på å velge blå. 
 




















Appendix D – Decision sheet for player 1 in the control group 
 
Vennligst ta en beslutning: 























Appendix E – Decision sheet for player 1 in the treatment group 
 
Før du tar beslutningen ønsker vi at du begrunner valget ditt. 
  
Vennligst ta en beslutning: 







Appendix F – Decision sheet for player 2 in the control group 
 
Den andre personen har valgt den gule (blå) boksen. 
Vennligst ta en beslutning: 





























Appendix G – Decision sheet for player 2 in the treatment group 
 
Den andre personen har valgt den gule (blå) boksen. 
Før du tar beslutningen ønsker vi at du begrunner valget ditt. 
  
Vennligst ta en beslutning: 






Appendix H – Control questions in the lab pilot 
1. Hvilket kjønn er du? 
 Mann  Kvinne 
 
2. Har du tidligere deltatt på slike eksperimenter? 
 Ja  Nei 
 
Vi ber deg til slutt svare på noen spørsmål som sjekker din forståelse av 
beslutningssituasjonen du har vært i: 
 
3. Den andre har valgt den gule boksen. Hvilket valg må du ta hvis du skal tjene 
mest mulig penger? 
 Gul  Blå 
 
4. Den andre har valgt den blå boksen. Hvilket valg må du ta hvis du skal tjene 
mest mulig penger? 
 Gul  Blå 
5. Hvilket alternativ gir høyest samlet betaling? 
 Begge velger gul 
 Begge velger blå 
 En velger gul og en velger blå
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